University of St. Thomas Law Journal
Volume 7
Issue 1 Fall 2009

Article 3

2009

The Exxon Valdez Litigation Marathon: A Window
on Punitive Damages
Catherine M. Sharkey

Bluebook Citation
Catherine M. Sharkey, The Exxon Valdez Litigation Marathon: A Window on Punitive Damages, 7 U. St. Thomas L.J. 25 (2009).

This Keynote Address is brought to you for free and open access by UST Research Online and the University of St. Thomas Law Journal. For more
information, please contact lawjournal@stthomas.edu.

\\server05\productn\U\UST\7-1\UST102.txt

unknown

Seq: 1

14-MAY-10

8:40

ARTICLE

THE EXXON VALDEZ LITIGATION
MARATHON: A WINDOW ON
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
CATHERINE M. SHARKEY*

I. U.S. SUPREME COURT RESPONSE TO OUTLIER PUNITIVE
DAMAGES AWARDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. Constitutional Excessiveness Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. Common Law Excessiveness Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
II. PUNITIVE DAMAGES AS A COMMON LAW REMEDY . . . . . . . . . .
A. Background: “Audible Criticisms” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. Diagnosis: Unpredictability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C. Solution: 1:1 Ratio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
III. LOOMING ISSUES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. Unpredictability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. Punitive Damages and Class Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C. Federalization of Punitive Damages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

27
27
31
35
35
38
42
44
44
46
51
53

The Exxon Valdez litigation marathon—a protracted, two-decade-long
battle over the propriety and constitutionality of the jury’s $5 billion
punitive damages award—provides a window into the past, present, and
future of punitive damages. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker1 provides an apt
vantage point from which to analyze the U.S. Supreme Court’s intervention
in response to outlier punitive damages awards. The litigation spans the
period of the U.S. Supreme Court’s interventionist course to reverse
punitive damages judgments in lower state and federal courts, from the trio
* Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. This article is a substantially
expanded version of the keynote address I delivered for the “Exxon Valdez Revisited: Rights and
Remedies” symposium at the University of St. Thomas School of Law on October 1, 2009. I am
grateful to Michael Allen, Thomas Colby, Jeffrey Fisher, Samuel Issacharoff, Richard Nagareda,
and Robert Rabin for their thoughtful comments. Michael Schachter provided excellent research
assistance.
1. 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008).
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of constitutional due process cases (BMW v. Gore,2 State Farm v.
Campbell,3 and Philip Morris USA v. Williams4), to the shift in gears to
federal admiralty for final resolution in Exxon Shipping.
Exxon Shipping also provides a lens through which to examine the
common law remedy of punitive damages. The Court is looking for a
coherent national solution to what it sees as the punitive damages problem.
There is the risk of outlier judgments given the soft standards of jury
determinations. Unstated but assumed is that the prospect of punitive
damages may coerce settlements or overdeter in ways that we cannot
effectively measure empirically. There is also the havoc wreaked by
punitive damages on international enforceability of judgments, way beyond
the amount and frequency of actual punitive damages.
The Court’s aim is an admirable one: to bring predictability to punitive
damages. The Court saw the case as an opportunity to address what it
perceives as the major problem with punitive damages cases: that similar
conduct between cases does not at all necessarily translate into comparable
damages awards. But the Court’s single-minded focus on unpredictability
almost inexorably drives it to embrace and reinforce an exclusively
retributive rationale for punitive damages. The Court invokes the analogy of
the sentencing guidelines as a model for achieving greater predictability;
once enamored with this model, the linkage between the guidelines and
criminal retribution spills over to punitive damages as civil retribution.
Sitting as a common law court of last resort—as opposed to its review
posture in the due process trilogy cases, where it was guided and
constrained by constitutional considerations—the Court is up front about its
preoccupation with the negative side effects of the punitive damages
remedy, without much focus on identifying its curative aspirations.
Finally, Exxon Shipping provides an opportunity to hypothesize about
the future of punitive damages doctrine and policy. Three issues loom
large. First, the Court’s fixation on unpredictability can be linked with a
broader trend in the Court’s jurisprudence of circumscribing the role of the
civil jury in the name of certainty, predictability, and efficiency. More
specifically, the Court’s concerns about the indeterminate and unmoored
nature of the jury’s determination of punitive damages would seem to apply
full stop to the jury’s determination of noneconomic, pain-and-suffering
damages.
Second, the Court had before it a case in a unique procedural posture:
the plaintiffs were part of a “limited fund,” mandatory, non-opt out class
action for resolution of punitive damages only. Because that element of the
case was not appealed to the Court, the Court left for another day resolution
2. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
3. 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
4. 549 U.S. 346 (2007).
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of the classwide determination of punitive damages. Here, cross-currents of
U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence point in opposite directions. On the one
hand, the punitive damages class provides protection for the defendant
against “overkill”—or being subjected to multiple punitive damages
judgments in successive cases for the same course of misconduct. On the
other hand, the Court has sharply limited the scope of the mandatory, nonopt out class action and likewise has relentlessly pushed an individualoriented conception of punitive damages. Here, there is an unresolved
tension between a viable public-policy solution to the multiple punitive
damages problem and the Court’s constitutional jurisprudence.
Third, the Court’s quest for a national solution to the punitive damages
problem and its equation of punitive damages and criminal fines presage
impending federalism battles. By elevating a single punitive damages
goal—that of retributive punishment—the Court sets the stage for a clash
between state courts and legislatures that might be inspired to define their
legitimate state interests in punitive damages differently.
I. U.S. SUPREME COURT RESPONSE TO OUTLIER PUNITIVE
DAMAGES AWARDS
A. Constitutional Excessiveness Review
Over the past fifteen years, the U.S. Supreme Court has erected an
edifice of federal constitutional due process review of punitive damages,
characterized disparagingly by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg as “recent
forays into the domain of state tort law under the banner of substantive due
process.”5 The Court’s constitutional excessiveness trio—BMW v. Gore,
State Farm v. Campbell, and Philip Morris USA v. Williams—set forth constitutional due process standards that every punitive damages award must
withstand. The Court provided three “guideposts” to direct state and federal
court review of punitive damages awards: the reprehensibility of defendant’s conduct; the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages
(where compensatory damages serve as a proxy of the harm inflicted by the
defendant); and comparable civil and criminal statutory penalties.6
Notwithstanding the Court’s oft-repeated statement that the reprehensibility guidepost is the most significant,7 the ratio factor has ascended the
5. Exxon Shipping, 128 S. Ct. at 2639 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
6. Gore, 517 U.S. at 574–85; Campbell, 538 U.S. at 419–28; Williams, 549 U.S. at 353.
7. See Gore, 517 U.S. at 575 (“[T]he most important indicium of the reasonableness of a
punitive damages award is the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct.”); Campbell,
538 U.S. at 419. Reprehensibility—more so than the other factors—is very much in the eye of the
beholder. Consider, for example, the range of views with respect to the reprehensibility of Exxon’s conduct in Exxon Shipping. Compare, e.g., Exxon Shipping, 128 S. Ct. at 2631 n.23 (“We
thus treat this case categorically as one of recklessness, for that was the jury’s finding.”), with,
e.g., id. at 2640 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]his was no mine-run
case of reckless behavior. The jury could reasonably have believed that Exxon knowingly allowed
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priority scale because it provides the most definitive guidance to lower
courts.8 Lower courts take comfort in the prospect of a safe harbor provided
by single-digit ratios, stemming from the Court’s proclamation that “few
awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory
damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process.”9 The Court has
hemmed and hawed a bit. In BMW v. Gore, the Court suggested ratios in the
3:1 or 4:1 range as reasonable.10 The Court reiterated the single-digit multiplier preference in State Farm v. Campbell, where it in fact emphasized
that, where compensatory damages are “substantial,” a ratio on the order of
1:1 would seem justified.11 All the while, the Court has protested (too
much, perhaps) that it is not establishing anything akin to a “simple mathematical formula,”12 even as it has prodded lower courts in the direction of
single-digit ratios.
The Court itself has fueled this heightened attention to ratios. According to the majority in Exxon Shipping, “The potential relevance of the ratio
between compensatory and punitive damages is indisputable, being a central feature in our due process analysis.”13 The tautology certainly holds:
since the U.S. Supreme Court announced the ratio guidepost as part of its
constitutional review edifice in 1996 in BMW v. Gore, it has repeated it
thereafter in each of its constitutional due process punitive damages cases.14
But repeated invocation of the ratio guidepost is not tantamount to an analytic justification. To my mind, the ratio guidepost—though undoubtedly
providing a definitive metric by which to judge the size of punitive damages awards—is theoretically bankrupt.15 The Court has never even tried to
a relapsed alcoholic repeatedly to pilot a vessel filled with millions of gallons of oil through
waters that provided the livelihood for the many plaintiffs in this case.”).
8. See Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L.
REV. 1353, 1420–28 (2006) (explaining that the Court was “building an increasingly elaborate
constitutional edifice around state-law awards of punitive damages,” and that while the Court
cautiously refused “to establish a ‘bright-line’ test for the ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, many state courts now seem to apply a de facto constitutional cap”).
9. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 425.
10. Gore, 517 U.S. at 580–81.
11. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 425 (“When compensatory damages are substantial, then a lesser
ratio, perhaps only equal to compensatory damages, can reach the outermost limit of the due
process guarantee.”).
12. Id. at 424–25; Gore, 517 U.S. at 582.
13. Exxon Shipping, 128 S. Ct. at 2629 (emphasis added).
14. See, e.g., Campbell, 538 U.S. at 424–28; Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346,
353 (2007).
15. Cass Sunstein and collaborators have labeled the ratio test “a crude test, because on no
theory of punitive awards is that ratio a good way to test the validity of the punitive award.” Cass
R. Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman & David Schkade, Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes on
Cognition and Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071, 2118 (1998); see also Keith N. Hylton,
Punitive Damages and the Economic Theory of Penalties, 87 GEO. L.J. 421, 454 (1998) (arguing
that the “presumption that the punitive award must stand in some reasonable numerical ratio to the
compensatory award . . . has been harmful”). But see Thomas B. Colby, Beyond the Multiple
Punishment Problem: Punitive Damages as Punishment for Individual, Private Wrongs, 87 MINN.
L. REV. 583, 606–08 (2003) (arguing that if the goal is to allow the victim to punish the defendant
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relate the ratio factor to any underlying justification for punitive damages,
be it retributive punishment or economic deterrence. With respect to the
punishment goal, the absence of a correlation between the mens rea or culpable state of mind of the wrongdoer and measure of the actual harm inflicted should surprise no one.16 If, instead, the law-and-economics
deterrence mantle is taken up, the relevant relationship between punitive
and compensatory damages focuses on the likelihood of detection, not the
relative size of the compensatory damages. To the economist, the punitive
damages “multiplier” should be the inverse of the probability of detection.
In other words, if a wrongdoer’s activities would likely escape detection
half of the time, compensatory damages alone would not sufficiently deter
the actor’s wrongdoing, and a multiplier of 2 (the inverse of 1/2) would have
to be applied.17 The ratio guidepost then would seem to distinguish itself as
having attained supreme relevance in the constitutional due process review
scheme, notwithstanding its complete lack of justifiability.
The ratio factor, moreover, may simply deflect attention from the fact
that the constitutional edifice is, in effect, a house of cards. The U.S. Supreme Court’s “recent forays into the domain of state tort law under the
banner of substantive due process” have been subject to withering attack,
not only from within the Court, but also from without, by the academy.18
for having inflicted a personal insult, then it makes sense to calibrate the size of the punishment to
the extent of the insult, which is measured, roughly, by the amount of compensatory damages).
16. See, e.g., Carol Steiker, No, Capital Punishment is Not Morally Required: Deterrence,
Deontology, and the Death Penalty, 58 STAN. L. REV. 751, 781 (2005) (“The culpability of the
individual agent bringing about the harm bears no essential relationship to the harm itself . . . .”).
17. See Robert Cooter, Punitive Damages for Deterrence: When and How Much?, 40 ALA.
L. REV. 1143, 1148 (1989) (“In general, the punitive multiple should equal the reciprocal of the
enforcement error for the sake of deterrence, which I call the ‘rule of the reciprocal.’”); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV.
869, 874 (1998) (suggesting that a “punitive damages multiplier” formula should be used to calculate punitive damages, where total damages are found by multiplying the amount lost in a particular case by the inverse of the probability that the injurer will be found liable); Joni Hersch & W.
Kip Viscusi, Punitive Damages by Numbers: Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, S. CT. ECON. REV.
(forthcoming 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1327045 (“The efficient level of total
damages from the standpoint of the economic theory of deterrence is the economic value of the
harm divided by the probability of detection.”); see also Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages
as Societal Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347, 367–70 (2003) (describing limitations of the “punitive
damages multiplier,” including the fact that it fails to take into account instances where there is
more “diffuse” societal harm).
18. See, e.g., Williams, 549 U.S. at 361 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“It matters not that the
Court styles today’s holding as ‘procedural’ because the ‘procedural’ rule is simply a confusing
implementation of the substantive due process regime this Court has created for punitive damages
. . . . Today’s opinion proves once again that this Court’s punitive damages jurisprudence is
‘insusceptible of principled application.’”); Campbell, 538 U.S. at 429 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I
adhere to the view expressed in my dissenting opinion in [BMW v. Gore] that the Due Process
Clause provides no substantive protections against ‘excessive’ or ‘unreasonable’ awards of punitive damages.”); see also Michael P. Allen, The Supreme Court, Punitive Damages and State
Sovereignty, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 10 (2004) (explaining that in the last fifteen years, the
Court “has shown that it will aggressively police punitive damage awards, principally through the
rubric of the Due Process Clause,” and arguing that “more confusion than clarity has flowed from
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Given the blistering critiques, it is worth considering alternative justifications for the Court’s intervention in the domain of state tort law. One of the
“roads not taken” is the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause.
Given the Court’s increasing insistence that punitive damages function akin
to criminal fines and penalties—and indeed are based upon the same individual retributive punishment rationale—the Eighth Amendment’s proportionality limit on criminal fines might seem a natural fit. The Court,
however, resisted its applicability in Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco
Disposal, Inc., drawing a sharp divide between civil suits between private
individuals and criminal suits prosecuted by the state.19 In a footnote in the
opinion, the Court emphasized that the fact that the proceeds of civil judgments do not revert to the state was germane to its distinction20—raising the
intriguing possibility that split-recovery schemes, whereby a portion of the
punitive damages award is given over to the state or a state-operated fund,
might require reexamination of the issue.21
My own preferred “road not taken” by the Court is intervention justified by extraterritoriality concerns: namely that a state is regulating beyond
its borders, exporting the costs of its punitive damages regulation onto other
states, thereby infringing upon those states’ legitimate interests.22 This federalism-based justification not only has reared its head in the Court’s due
process trio, but it has done so steadfastly, even where its applicability to
the case at hand was questionable, at best. BMW v. Gore squarely fit the
paradigm; in that case, the Court was motivated to intervene, at least in part,
to forestall Alabama’s imposition of its regulatory policy upon other states,
the Court’s jurisprudence”); Michael L. Rustad, Happy No More: Federalism Derailed by the
Court that Would Be King of Punitive Damages, 64 MD. L. REV. 461, 467–68 (2005) (“[T]he
Court should take the next exit off the substantive due process highway and leave tort reform to
the states.”); Tracy A. Thomas, Proportionality and the Supreme Court’s Jurisprudence of Remedies, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 73, 76 (2007) (analyzing the use of measurement in the Court’s jurisprudence on punitive damages, concluding that this “remedial proportionality” is a form of “judicial
activism,” and arguing for “a return to the traditional judicial review of remedies deferring to the
initial fact finders in each case”).
19. Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257,
263–64 (1989) (“[The Eighth Amendment] does not constrain an award of money damages in a
civil suit when the government neither has prosecuted the action nor has any right to receive a
share of the damages awarded.”).
20. Id. at 276 n.21 (leaving open the issue whether a government’s recovery of punitive
damages in a civil action would implicate the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause).
21. See Sharkey, supra note 17, at 434–35 (suggesting factors relevant to an Excessive Fines
Clause analysis include whether the money reverts to the general state treasury (as opposed to a
court-administered fund) and what role the state plays in the litigation (e.g., whether it can intervene in the proceedings at any stage)); see also Engquist v. Oregon Dept. of Agriculture, 478 F.3d
985, 1005–07 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause did
not apply to Oregon’s split-recovery statute because it only “applies to government acts that are
intended to punish, and the split-remedy scheme is not intended to punish”).
22. See Issacharoff & Sharkey, supra note 8, at 1420–28 (explaining that the “extraterritorial
effect of punitive damages awards” is at the heart of the “Supreme Court’s federalization of the
law of punitive damages”).
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or the nation as a whole. The Court invoked interests in “state sovereignty”
and “comity”23—a fledgling attempt to articulate a federalism-based ground
for intervention. This jurisprudential line was picked up again in State Farm
v. Campbell, where, once again, the Court seemed prone to restrain Utah
from instigating national regulatory policy, regardless of whether the alleged wrongdoing on the part of the defendant insurance company was illegal throughout the nation.24 Finally, the Court invoked this federalismbased rationale in Philip Morris USA v. Williams, a case that, on its face,
would seem to have little to do with cost exportation, given that it involved
a single plaintiff smoker and the evidence introduced was limited to other
smokers within the state.25 It is a testament to the significance of the federalism rationale that it nonetheless rears its head in this case.26 The Court has
taken a preliminary stab at articulating a federalism-based extraterritoriality
rationale, but none of its cases has rested squarely on this justification for
intervention. Given the Court’s signaling of a move away from the substantive-due-process justification towards procedural due process,27 the federalism-based justification might shoulder a more significant burden in future
cases.28
B. Common Law Excessiveness Review
Exxon Shipping represents a sharp break in the Court’s punitive damages due process trajectory. The Court takes up the case under federal admiralty jurisdiction, declining to pursue constitutional due process review. An
23. Gore, 517 U.S. at 580–81.
24. State Farm v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419–22 (2003) (finding that a state does not “have
a legitimate concern in imposing punitive damages to punish a defendant for unlawful acts committed outside of the State’s jurisdiction,” and that a “basic principle of federalism is that each
State may make its own reasoned judgment about what conduct is permitted or proscribed within
its borders”).
25. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 349–51 (2007); id. at 359 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (explaining that “evidence attesting to the possible harm the defendant’s extensive
deceitful conduct caused other Oregonians was properly presented to the jury”).
26. Id. at 352–53 (stating that where the amounts of punitive damages are “sufficiently
large,” a state’s punitive damages system “may impose one State’s (or one jury’s) ‘policy choice,’
say as to the conditions under which (or even whether) certain products can be sold, upon ‘neighboring States’ with different public policies”).
27. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Federal Incursions and State Defiance: Punitive Damages in
the Wake of Philip Morris v. Williams, 46 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 449, 454–55 (2010).
28. Further development of this federalism-based justification for the Court’s intervention
would have to contend with the Court’s concerns (articulated most vociferously by Justice David
Souter) about judicial enforcement of federalism. See, e.g., U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,
649–50 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that federalism concerns arising out of the Commerce Clause should be left to Congress); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 761 (1999) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing the Court’s understanding of federalism for ignoring the “accepted authority of Congress to bind states under the [Fair Labor Standards Act] and to provide for enforcement
of federal rights in state court”); see also Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative Law’s
Federalism: Preemption, Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge of Federal Power, 57 DUKE L.J.
1933, 1941–48 (2008) (describing federalism and the “realist balancing that underlies its modern
judicial enforcement”).
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immediate effect of this choice is that it allowed Justices Antonin Scalia
and Clarence Thomas—repeat dissenters in the constitutional due process
cases, on the ground that they do not believe that substantive due process in
any way restrains common law punitive damages29—to advocate for the
restraint of outlier punitive damages judgments. But the switch to federal
admiralty has broader ramifications. As the Court emphasized, “We are acting here in the position of a common law court of last review, faced with a
perceived defect in a common law remedy.”30 In this procedural posture,
the Court could address head-on the common law standard of excessiveness
as well as the desirability of regulating punitive damages as a common law
remedy. Defensively, the Court concedes that “[s]ome will murmur that this
smacks too much of policy and too little of principle.”31 But, for a “common law court of last review,” policy-inflected analysis is par for the
course.
In narrow doctrinal terms, the Court chooses an “admiralty-law ratio”
for punitive damages, setting the default at a 1:1 ratio.32 But, of much
29. See BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 598–99 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (joined by Justice Thomas) (“I do not regard the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause as a secret repository of substantive guarantees against ‘unfairness’—neither the unfairness of an excessive civil
compensatory award, nor the unfairness of an ‘unreasonable’ punitive award”); Campbell, 538
U.S. at 429 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Due Process Clause provides no substantive protections
against ‘excessive’ or ‘unreasonable’ awards of punitive damages.”); id. at 429 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“I continue to believe that the Constitution does not constrain the size of punitive damages awards.”) (internal quotations omitted); Williams, 549 U.S. at 353, 361–62 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting); id. at 362–64 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas).
30. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2629 (2008).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 2630, 2633. Several federal and state courts have signaled a desire to limit the
Court’s 1:1 ratio to the realm of federal admiralty and have refused to impose a 1:1 ratio as a
matter of constitutional due process. See, e.g., Southern Union Co. v. Irvin, 563 F.3d 788, 791 n.1
(9th Cir. 2009) (upholding a 3:1 punitive-compensatory ratio while “noting . . . that when the
Supreme Court selected a ratio for federal maritime law purposes, rather than constitutional purposes, it saw a ratio of one to one as the ‘fair upper limit’”); Grosch v. Tunica County Miss., 2009
WL 161856, at *16 (N.D. Miss. Apr. 1, 2009) (rejecting claim that 6:1 ratio was excessive under
Exxon Shipping, concluding that “the holding in Exxon was confined to cases arising under federal
admiralty law and has no application to the case at hand”); Merrick v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co.,
594 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1192 (D. Nev. 2008) (upholding an 8:1 ratio, “reject[ing] the notion that the
Nevada Supreme Court would adopt as a rule of decision the maritime law 1:1 ratio recently
announced by the Supreme Court in [Exxon Shipping]”); Smith v. Xerox Corp., 584 F. Supp. 2d
905, 915 n.18 (N.D. Tex. 2008) (“Exxon Shipping was a maritime common law case, inapplicable
here.”) (dictum); American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Miell, 569 F. Supp. 2d 841, 859 (N.D. Iowa
2008) (upholding a nearly 2:1 ratio, emphasizing that “the Court did not conclude that the Constitution prohibits a punitive damage award greater than the amount awarded for compensatory
damages”).
State courts have been slightly more emphatic in their rejection of attempts to extend the
reach of Exxon Shipping beyond federal maritime law. See, e.g., Line v. Ventura, 2009 WL
1425993, at *11 (Ala. May 22, 2009) (upholding 5:2 ratio, rejecting argument that the U.S. Supreme Court established a new constitutionally established ratio of 0.65:1 “in light of the [Exxon
Shipping] Court’s explicit limitation of its holding to federal maritime common law”); Diversified
Water Diversion, Inc. v. Standard Water Control Sys., Inc., 2008 WL 4300258, at *5 n.4 (Minn.
App. Sept. 23, 2008) (“[T]he Court’s decision in Exxon to limit a punitive-damage award to the
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greater significance, the case presents a platform for the Court to provide a
template for state appellate courts (and lower federal courts)—an analytic
framework for punitive damages excessiveness review that could be emulated by other courts typically sitting as common law courts.33 Seen in this
guise, the Court’s pronouncements were intended for a much larger audience, not limited to the federal admiralty realm. The Court took the opportunity to reiterate its plea from State Farm v. Campbell, that “‘when
compensatory damages are substantial, then a lesser ratio . . . can reach the
outermost limit of the due process guarantee.’”34 Lest lower courts miss
what the Court was up to, the Court made an explicit link between its common law analysis and its due process jurisprudence, stating that “[i]n this
case, then, the constitutional outer limit may well be 1:1.”35 And the dissent
amount of the compensatory-damage award was based on its interpretation of the limit imposed
on punitive damages by maritime law . . . . Maritime law is not at issue here.”); Powell v. Bank of
America, 2008 WL 6506397 (S.C. Com. Pl. Feb. 12, 2008) (upholding a 7:1 ratio, setting aside
Exxon Shipping as “narrowly confined to federal maritime tort cases governed by federal common
law where Congress has not passed any statutes on punitive damages”); Peters v. Rivers Edge
Min. Inc., 680 S.E.2d 791, 825 (W. Va. 2009) (upholding ratio slightly greater than 1:1, citing
Campbell and distinguishing Exxon Shipping as providing “a fair upper limit in . . . maritime
cases”).
33. Lower courts have taken the cue from the U.S. Supreme Court and have begun to cite
Exxon Shipping, along with Gore, Campbell, and Williams in their constitutional due process
excessiveness review—even while acknowledging that, by its terms, Exxon Shipping is limited to
federal admiralty. See, e.g., Mendez-Matos v. Municipality of Guaynabo, 557 F.3d 36, 54 n.14
(1st Cir. 2009) (upholding a 1:1 ratio, mentioning Exxon Shipping’s 1:1 ratio, nonetheless acknowledging that “[b]y its own terms, . . . the rule does not apply here”); Leavey v. Unum Provident Corp., 295 Fed. App’x 255, 259 n.1 (9th Cir. 2008) (upholding a 1.5:1 ratio, noting that
“[w]hile the Supreme Court’s recent decision in [Exxon Shipping] ‘reviewed a jury award for
conformity with maritime law, rather than the outer limit allowed by due process,’ the Court’s
statements in that case support the district court’s decision to reduce the award here”) (citing
Exxon Shipping along with Gore and Campbell); Hirsh v. Lecuona, 2008 WL 2795859, at *6 (D.
Neb. July 18, 2008) (upholding a ratio of less than 1:1, highlighting “perhaps [the] most commonly cited indicium of an unreasonable or excessive punitive damages award is its ratio to the
actual harm inflicted on the plaintiff” and citing Gore and Exxon Shipping). See also In re Bayside
Prison Litig., 2009 WL 1653893, at **5 (3d Cir. June 15, 2009) (vacating a 4.5:1 ratio, citing
approvingly Campbell, Gore, and Exxon Shipping).
34. Exxon Shipping, 128 S. Ct. at 2626 (quoting Campbell, 538 U.S. at 425).
35. Id. at 2634 n.28 (emphasis added). See also Jurinko v. Medical Protective Co., 305 Fed.
App’x 13, 27 n.15 (3d Cir. 2008) (“The Court did not directly address constitutional limits. . . .
However, the Court again said that, when compensatory damages are substantial, ‘the constitutional outer limit may well be 1:1.’”). Exxon Shipping may exert an even greater indirect effect
(more difficult to track), providing additional impetus to courts to cite Campbell for the constitutional 1:1 limit. See, e.g., Roby v. McKesson Corp., 219 P.3d 749, 798 (Cal. 2009) (“After applying the test that the high court articulated in [Campbell], we conclude that a one-to-one ratio
between compensatory and punitive damages is the federal constitutional limit here.”).
Predictably, defendants have pressed the 1:1 ratio as a constitutional limit. See, e.g., Brief for
Defendant-Appellant at 57, Worldwide Network Servs. v. Dyncorp Int’l, No. 08-2108(L) (4th Cir.
Feb. 2, 2009) (“[T]he Court has specifically instructed that ‘[w]hen compensatory damages are
substantial, then a lesser ratio, perhaps only equal to compensatory damages, can reach the outermost limit of the due process guarantee.’”) (citation omitted); Brief of Defendants/Appellants
Residential Funding Co., LLC and Homecomings Financial, LLC at 100, Mitchell v. Residential
Funding Co., No. WD70210 (Mo. Ct. App. May 20, 2009) (“The Court’s recent decision in Exxon
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forlornly asks: “On next opportunity, will the Court rule, definitively, that
1:1 is the ceiling due process requires in all of the states, and for all federal
claims?”36 In anticipation of this fate, a few lower courts have gravitated
here, applying Exxon Shipping’s 1:1 ratio full stop in constitutional due
process review of punitive damages.37
But regardless of whether lower courts get out ahead of the U.S. Supreme Court in terms of applying a resolute 1:1 ratio across the board, or
instead cite (and/or distinguish) Exxon Shipping approvingly amidst the
constitutional due process cases, the import of the Court’s use of a platform
from which to guide lower courts is clear. As one federal district court
judge put it, “[a]lthough Exxon is a maritime law case, it is clear that the
Supreme Court intends that its holdings have a much broader application.”38 And, a state court, remarking upon Exxon Shipping’s reverberations
beyond federal admiralty, suggested that the Court’s reasoning “is very persuasive in identifying certain factors relevant to determining the amount of
a punitive damages award . . . .”39 With that, the lower courts are off and
running, taking up the gauntlet of emulating the U.S. Supreme Court’s policy-inflected scrutiny of punitive damages as a common law remedy.40 The
Court’s conceptualization of punitive damages—including its diagnosis and
solution of defects in the remedy—takes on greater significance, given the
metaphor of the lower courts waiting in the wings and watching.

Shipping confirmed that a 1:1 ratio generally is the constitutional maximum when, as here, the
compensatory damages are substantial.”).
36. Exxon Shipping, 128 S. Ct. at 2639 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
37. See, e.g., CP Construction, LLC v. Holder, Civ. No. 3:06-1153, 2008 WL 4908866, at *3
(M.D. Tenn. Nov. 13, 2008) (upholding a 1:1 ratio, reasoning that “[t]he Supreme Court has
recently upheld the proposition, albeit in a maritime case, that a ratio of 1:1 is ‘a fair upper limit
. . . .’ Thus, the amount of punitive damages awarded to [plaintiffs] should not exceed the amount
of compensatory damages awarded to each entity”); Essex Ins. Co. v. Prof. Bldg. Contractors,
Inc., No. B206879, 2009 WL 2152463, at *13 (Cal. App. 2d July 21, 2009) (upholding a 1:1 ratio,
relying upon the median ratio in Exxon Shipping as “sufficient to punish [the defendant] and deter
it and other insurers from similar conduct”); Stevens v. Vons Cos., 2d. Civ. Nos. B196755,
B201528, Ventura County Sup. Ct. No. SC041162, 2009 WL 117902, at *14 (Cal. App. 2d July
20, 2009) (“The reasonableness of the trial court’s selection of a 1:1 ratio is supported by [Exxon
Shipping].”).
38. Hayduk v. City of Johnstown, 580 F. Supp. 2d 429, 483 n.46 (W.D. Pa. 2008).
39. Bridgeport Harbor Place I, LLC v. Ganim, No. X06CV04184523S, 2008 WL 4926925, at
*12 (Conn. Super. Oct. 31, 2008).
40. See, e.g., id. at *12 (looking to Exxon Shipping for guidance in terms of “the need for
some reasonable predictability in the severity of punitive awards; and . . . the need that punitive
awards will treat defendants with a fair probability of suffering in like degree for like damage”);
Essex Ins. Co., 2009 WL 2152463, at *13 (“The Supreme Court in Exxon . . . reviewed studies
evaluating the median ratio of punitive to compensatory verdicts, which ‘put the median ratio for
the entire gamut of circumstances at less than 1:1, meaning that the compensatory award exceeds
the punitive award in most cases.’”); Stevens, 2009 WL 117902, at *14 (citing empirical studies
relied upon by the U.S. Supreme Court to establish the 1:1 ratio).
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COMMON LAW REMEDY

The debate over punitive damages as a common law remedy has
reached high decibels. Exxon Shipping provides the Court with a ripe opportunity to dive headlong into the policy debate—an opportunity resisted
in its previous constitutional due process cases, notwithstanding repeated
goading from the various parties and amici in the cases.41 The Court starts
from the premise that “American punitive damages have been the target of
audible criticism in recent decades . . . .”42 It then proceeds to diagnose the
underlying core of the problem generating discontent: the unpredictable nature of punitive damages awards. The Court follows with a proposed solution of a 1:1 ratio of punitive to compensatory damages. With the shackles
of constitutional due process review removed, the Court’s analysis of punitive damages as a common law remedy provides a clear, unadorned view of
how the Court perceives this remedy and how it would like lower courts to
follow suit when conducting excessiveness review.
A. Background: “Audible Criticisms”
Foreign countries view American punitive damages as an abomination.43 The Exxon Shipping majority begins by noting that “[p]unitive damages overall are higher and more frequent in the United States than they are
anywhere else.”44 The Court—not known for its warm embrace of foreign
41. See, e.g., Brief of Law and Economics Scholars et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 24, BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1995); Brief of the American Tort Reform Association et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 9, Gore, 517 U.S. 559; Brief of A. Mitchell
Polinsky, Steven Shavell, and the Citizens for a Sound Economy Foundation as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioner at 4, State Farm v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003) (strongly supporting “the
use of deterrence theory to inform decision-making in punitive damages cases”); Brief of Certain
Leading Social Scientists and Legal Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 3–4, 6,
Campbell, 538 U.S. 408; Brief of A. Mitchell Polinsky, Steven Shavell, and the Cato Institute as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 6, Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007)
(adopting a “public policy, economic approach”); Brief of Neil Vidmar et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondent at 6–7, 12, Williams, 549 U.S. 346.
42. Exxon Shipping, 128 S. Ct. at 2624.
43. Id. at 2623–24; see also, e.g., John Y. Gotanda, Charting Developments Concerning Punitive Damages: Is the Tide Changing?, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 507, 510, 513–16 (2007)
(explaining that most civil law countries “prohibit punitive damages in private actions because
they consider punitive damages a form of punishment that is appropriate only in criminal proceedings,” and discussing difficulties associated with enforcing an American award of punitive damages in such countries); Volker Behr, Punitive Damages in American and German Law—
Tendencies Towards Approximation of Apparently Irreconcilable Concepts, 78 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 105, 127–29 (2003) (describing the evolution of the hostile attitude towards punitive damages in Germany). Punitive damages are often linked with class actions and the contingency fee
system as signposts of “American exceptionalism”—typically viewed with skepticism from
abroad. See Adam Liptak, Foreign Courts Wary of U.S. Punitive Damages, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26,
2008, at A, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/26/us/26punitive.html (describing the
international community’s hostile attitude towards punitive damages).
44. Exxon Shipping, 128 S. Ct. at 2623.
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countries’ judicial authority45—surveys the international landscape of punitive damages. In England and Wales, punitive damages are reserved for
narrow classes of cases—involving (i) oppressive, arbitrary, or unconstitutional action by government servants;46 (ii) actions where the ill-gotten
gains were likely to exceed compensatory damages; and (iii) actions specifically authorized by statute—and are subject to judicially imposed guidelines.47 Canada and Australia cabin the award of punitive damages to
outrageous conduct.48 Civil code countries, including France, Germany,
Austria, and Switzerland, eschew punitive damages altogether.49 Germany
goes even further, joining Japan and Italy, among other foreign countries, in
refusing to enforce punitive damages judgments entered in the United
States as anathema to public policy.50 The Court’s international review may
simplify the picture of foreign rejection of punitive damages,51 but it cannot
be gainsaid that there is a strong distaste abroad for the American system’s
seeming incorporation of criminal punishment into private civil law by way
of punitive damages.
The attack on punitive damages from within the United States has been
even more unrelenting, fueled by myriad organizations representing corporate and business interests. Charges of “runaway jury verdicts” and “blockbuster awards” have led to successful enactment of a variety of legislative
tort reform measures at the state level, including caps or limits on punitive
damages.52 Mounting academic literature addresses every aspect of the pu45. The Court has been especially critical of the use of foreign judicial authority to interpret
constitutional provisions. See, e.g., Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 990 n.* (2002) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in denial of certiorari) (explaining that the “Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence
should not impose foreign moods, fads or fashions on Americans”); Printz v. United States, 521
U.S. 898, 921 n.11 (1997) (Scalia, J.) (“[C]omparative analysis [is] inappropriate to the task of
interpreting a constitution.”).
46. Indeed, the very first punitive damages case involved such an abuse of governmental
power. Huckle v. Money, (1763) 95 Eng. Rep. 768, 768–69 (K.B.) (upholding a jury’s award of
three hundred pounds against a government officer).
47. Exxon Shipping, 128 S. Ct. at 2623.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 2623–24 (citing Gotanda, supra note 43, at 514, 518, 528). As the Court notes,
foreign resistance to enforcement of U.S. punitive damages judgments may be waning. Id.
51. For example, there appears to be a countervailing trend of increasing experimentation
with supracompensatory damages (purposely not termed “punitive”) such as compensatory damage multipliers in proposed and recently enacted consumer protection statutes. See, e.g., Mark A.
Behrens, Gregory L. Fowler & Silvia Kim, Global Litigation Trends, 17 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L.
165, 192–93 (2009) (explaining that recent developments in some civil code nations, including
Germany, France, Italy, Argentina, and Thailand, indicate increasing receptivity toward punitive
damages).
52. See, e.g., Jonathan Klick & Catherine M. Sharkey, What Drives the Passage of Damage
Caps?, in EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF JUDICIAL SYSTEMS AROUND THE WORLD 299, 301–10 (Institutum Jurisprudentiae, Academia Sinica 2008) (providing evidence that state legislatures enact
caps in response to perceptions of runaway juries and blockbuster awards); see also Judge Louis
Guirola & Thomas L. Carpenter, Jr., Punitive Damages in Mississippi: What Has Happened, What
Is Happening and What Is Coming Next, 73 MISS. L.J. 135, 171–172 (2003) (calling attention to
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nitive damages debate, from the theoretical underpinnings of awarding
supracompensatory damages and the doctrinal evolution and expansion of
grounds of punitive damages,53 to the empirical reality of the size, frequency, and characteristics of judge- and jury-awarded punitive damages.54
Two dueling camps have emerged on the empirical front. One champions
the view that punitive damages are, in fact, out of control, characterized by
unmoored juries’ (and to a lesser extent, judges’) granting of unbridled
awards.55 A deep skepticism of the role of the jury, and its capacity to
the size and frequency of jury verdicts in Mississippi prior to the enactment of punitive damages
caps in the state); Chad E. Stewart, Damages in Alabama’s Civil Justice System: An Uncivil War
Within the State, 29 CUMB. L. REV. 201, 213 (1998) (complaining that jury awards in Alabama
were out of control in advance of tort reform in 1999).
53. See, e.g., Thomas B. Colby, Clearing the Smoke from Philip Morris v. Williams: The
Past, Present, and Future of Punitive Damages, 118 YALE L.J. 392, 395–96, 414–64 (2008) (explaining that historically, “punitive damages were generally treated as punishment for private
wrongs to individuals, not public wrongs to society,” and arguing that “punitive damages are
constitutional if they fulfill their historical role of punishing the defendant for the private wrong
committed upon the individual plaintiff, but they are unconstitutional in their (pre-Williams) recent incarnation as punishment for the public wrong visited on society”); Keith N. Hylton, Due
Process and Punitive Damages: An Economic Approach, 2 CHARLESTON L. REV. 345, 347 (2008)
(setting out an economic model of due process analysis and applying it to the punitive damages
issue); Benjamin C. Zipursky, A Theory of Punitive Damages, 84 TEX. L. REV. 105, 105 (2005)
(arguing that punitive damages have a “double aspect,” including a “criminal aspect” “[i]nsofar as
they pertain to the state’s goal of imposing a punishment upon a defendant who merits deterrence
or retribution,” and a “civil aspect” “[i]nsofar as they pertain to the plaintiff’s ‘right to be punitive’”). See generally Anthony J. Sebok, What Did Punitive Damages Do?, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
163 (2003) (describing the history of early punitive damage awards); Note, Developments in the
Law – The Paths of Civil Litigation, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1783 (2000) (analyzing the evolution of
punitive damages, examining recent court decisions, and providing a survey of criticism aimed at
punitive damages).
54. See, e.g., Erik Moller et al., Punitive Damages in Financial Injury Jury Verdicts: Executive Summary, RAND MR-889-IJC (1997), available at 1997 WL MR-888-IJC (describing the
number of punitive damage awards in financial injury cases in selected jurisdictions during the
period 1985 to 1994, examining patterns in these awards, and estimating the “percentage of the
financial injury punitive awards . . . that would have been affected by caps of various sizes and
how the caps would have affected the total amount of punitive damages awarded in such cases”);
Deborah R. Hensler & Erik Moller, Trends in Punitive Damages: Preliminary Data from Cook
County, Illinois and San Francisco, California, RAND DRU-1014-IJC (Mar. 1995), available at
http://www.rand.org/pubs/drafts/2008/DRU1014.pdf (analyzing the sizes of median punitive damages awards in Cook County, Illinois and San Francisco, California for the period 1960–94); Erik
Moller, Trends in Punitive Damages: Preliminary Data from California, RAND DRU-1059 (Apr.
1995), available at
http://www.rand.org/pubs/drafts/2008/DRU1014.pdf
(analyzing jury
awards from California Superior Court jurisdictions, finding that the number of punitive damages
awards in each jurisdiction was “quite modest,” and observing that punitive damages were
awarded more frequently in some types of cases, such as intentional tort cases and business and
contract disputes).
55. See, e.g., Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Punitive Damages: How Judges and Juries
Perform, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2004) (finding through empirical analysis that juries differ from
judges in awarding punitive damages, and that “juries are significantly more likely to award punitive damages than are judges and award higher levels of punitive damages”); W. Kip Viscusi, The
Blockbuster Punitive Damages Awards, 53 EMORY L.J. 1405 (2004) (analyzing sixty-four punitive
damages awards of at least $100 million, and finding that these awards (1) have increased over
time, with the majority taking place in 1999; (2) have rarely been reversed; and (3) would be
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transform its expression of moral outrage into a dollar value—characterized
as “scaling without a modulus”—pervades criticisms of punitive damages.56 The defensive camp, on the other hand, claims that the withering
attack on the jury and punitive damages is all sound and fury—the rhetoric
is belied by the underlying empirical evidence, which reveals a picture of
relatively predictable, stable, not to mention rare, punitive damages awards,
characterized by a steady relationship to the size of compensatory
damages.57
B. Diagnosis: Unpredictability
The Court steeps itself in the empirical literature and dives headlong
into the debate.58 The Court deals a decisive blow to the tort reformers’
claim of out-of-control jury awards: “A survey of the literature reveals that
affected by the ratio limits outlined in State Farm v. Campbell if a ratio of 1:1 became the upper
limit on punitive damages awards).
56. Daniel Kahneman, David A. Schkade & Cass R. Sunstein, Shared Outrage, Erratic
Awards, in PUNITIVE DAMAGES: HOW JURIES DECIDE 31, 41–42 (Cass Sunstein et al. eds., 2002)
(explaining that “[m]agnitude scaling without a modulus produces extremely large variability in
judgments of any particular stimulus because of arbitrary individual differences in the selection of
moduli,” and concluding that “[t]he assignment of punitive damages satisfies the definition of
magnitude scaling without a modulus”); see also Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages:
Should Juries Decide?, 82 TEX. L. REV. 381 (2003) (reviewing SUNSTEIN ET AL. PUNITIVE DAMAGES: HOW JURIES DECIDE (2002) and criticizing the leap from empirical analysis to policy prescription of removing the jury from decisionmaking).
57. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg et al., Variability in Punitive Damages: An Empirical Assessment of the U.S. Supreme Court’s Decision in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 166 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECONOMICS 5 (2010) (arguing that punitive damages are not
unpredictable) [hereinafter Eisenberg et al., Exxon]; Theodore Eisenberg et al., The Relation Between Punitive and Compensatory Awards: Combining Extreme Data with the Mass of Awards, in
CIVIL JURIES AND CIVIL JUSTICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 105 (Brian H. Bornstein et al. eds., 2008) (arguing that punitive damages awards have not increased over time and
concluding that there is a significant relationship between punitive awards and compensatory
damages, even for extreme awards); Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, The Significant Association Between Punitive and Compensatory Damages in Blockbuster Cases: A Methodological
Primer, 3 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 175 (2006) (arguing that a strong association exists even
between blockbuster awards and compensatory damages); Theodore Eisenberg et al., Juries,
Judges, and Punitive Damages: Empirical Analyses Using the Civil Justice Survey of State Courts
1992, 1996 and 2001 Data, 3 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 263, 269 (2006) (analyzing thousands of
trials from several populous counties in three major data sets and finding steady ratios of punitive
damages to compensatory damages in jury trials and bench trials in 1992, 1996, and 2001) [hereinafter Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges]; Theodore Eisenberg et al., The Predictability of Punitive
Damages, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 623 (1997) (challenging the claim that punitive damages awards are
out of control by demonstrating a “strong and statistically significant correlation between compensatory and punitive damages” in 45 populous counties); Neil Vidmar & Mary R. Rose, Punitive
Damages by Juries in Florida: In Terrorem and in Reality, 38 HARV. J. LEGIS. 487, 492 (2001)
(finding a steady ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages in Florida between 1989 and
1998).
58. It is worth mentioning that, with respect to its empirical analysis, the Court pursued its
own tack—one not urged to it by any of the parties or amici in the case. One downside to this
approach is that the Court was not privy to debate on the empirical evidence presented in the
various studies upon which it relied.
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discretion to award punitive damages has not mass-produced runaway
awards.”59 Canvassing the universe of empirical studies of punitive damages, the Court concludes that “[b]y most accounts the median ratio of punitive to compensatory awards has remained less than 1:1.”60 And the general
picture that emerges is one of “an overall restraint” on the part of juries.61
But this music to the ears of plaintiffs’ attorneys and consumer group representatives is fleeting.
For, having laid out a picture of relative stability and restraint, the
Court then delivers its diagnosis: “The real problem, it seems, is the stark
unpredictability of punitive awards.”62 The Court is primarily motivated by
a rule-of-law concern with ensuring “fairness as consistency.”63 According
to the Court, “a penalty should be reasonably predictable in its severity, so
that even Justice Holmes’s ‘bad man’ can look ahead with some ability to
know what the stakes are in choosing one course of action or another.”64 In
the end, the Court is motivated by “the need to protect against the possibility (and the disruptive cost to the legal system) of awards that are unpredictable and unnecessary, either for deterrence or for measured
retribution . . . .”65
With that overriding aim, the Court searches in vain for empirical evidence that like cases are being treated alike in terms of the award of punitive damages. Finding no empirical study of actual punitive damages
awards to shed light on this core question66—and refusing to rely upon
existing mock jury studies that nonetheless suggest inconsistency across
similar factual situations, on the ground that the research was funded by
Exxon, a party in the case67—the Court sticks with its intuition that such
59. Exxon Shipping, 128 S. Ct. at 2624 (emphasis added).
60. Id. n.14 (citing Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, supra note 57, at 269; Vidmar & Rose,
supra note 57, at 492).
61. Id. at 2624–25.
62. Id. at 2625 (emphasis added).
63. Id. The Court explained that “[w]hatever may be the constitutional significance of the
unpredictability of high punitive awards, this feature of happenstance is in tension with the function of the awards as punitive, just because of the implication of unfairness that an eccentrically
high punitive verdict carries in a system whose commonly held notion of law rests on a sense of
fairness in dealing with one another.” Id. at 2627.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 2633.
66. Id. at 2626 (“We are aware of no scholarly work pointing to consistency across punitive
awards in cases involving similar claims and circumstances.”).
67. Id. at 2626 n.17. The Court explains that “[b]ecause this research was funded in part by
Exxon, we decline to rely on it.” Id. “Footnote 17” provoked a range of responses. Those critical
of industry-funded research held it out as evidence that the Court looked askance at such interestgroup funded research. Others suggested this was an exaggeration of the narrower concern of the
Court, namely that an actual party to the litigation (Exxon) had provided the funding. See Adam
Liptak, From One Footnote, a Debate over the Tangles of Law, Science and Money, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 15, 2008, at A16, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/25/washington/25bar.html
(describing Exxon’s funding of research and punitive damages and discussing the range of responses to “Footnote 17”); Shireen A. Barday, Note, Punitive Damages, Remunerated Research,
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inconsistency is the root of the punitive damages problem. A salient anecdotal example, moreover, backs the Court’s suspicions: in BMW v. Gore—
the very first case in which the Court intervened to overturn a punitive
damages award—the jury had awarded $4 million in punitive damages;
whereas, in a companion state case raising a nearly identical claim of fraud
in the nondisclosure of the repainting of a car—“strikingly similar facts”
according to the Court—another jury had rejected the claim for punitive
damages altogether.68
But the Court is not content to rest on its intuition or this single piece
of anecdotal evidence; instead, for inspiration, the Court turns to the existing empirical studies of actual punitive damages verdicts throughout the
country. The Court draws heavily from the Civil Justice Surveys of State
Courts, conducted by the Bureau of Justice Statistics of the U.S. Department of Justice and the National Center for State Courts in 1991–92, 1996,
and 2001.69 These data include information from state court trials of tort,
contract, and property cases, drawn from forty-five counties, chosen to be
representative of the seventy-five most populous counties in the United
States.70
The Court homes in on three representative statistics in the aggregate
data of the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages: the median,
mean, and standard deviation. The average median, or midpoint, ratio (i.e.,
the point at which half of the punitive-compensatory ratios lie above and
half lie below) is 0.62:1—meaning that, on average, punitive damages are
smaller than compensatory damages, such that the ratio is less than 1:1.71
The mean, or arithmetic average, punitive-compensatory ratio is 2.90:1. Finally, the standard deviation—which measures variation from the mean and
median ratio—is 13.81.72 Scrutinizing these statistics, the Court asks
“whether the spread between high and low individual awards is acceptable”
and the Legal Profession, 61 STAN. L. REV. 711, 712–13 (2008) (examining and criticizing industry-funded research, including in the Exxon Shipping case, and proposing two reforms: mandatory
disclosure of funding sources for articles and creation of a database categorizing articles by funding source).
Past practice would seem to bolster the narrower interpretation of the Court’s concern. The
Court relied on the Exxon-funded studies in previous punitive damages decisions. See, e.g.,
Cooper Industries v. Leatherman Tool Group, 532 U.S. 424, 432 n.5 (2001) (citing Cass Sunstein
et al., Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law), 107 YALE
L.J. 2071, 2074 (1998)). What seems to distinguish this case, then, is the fact that Exxon is a party
to the litigation.
68. Exxon Shipping, 128 S. Ct. at 2626.
69. For a detailed description of these data, see Eric Helland et al., Data Watch: Tort-uring
the Data, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 207, 214 (2005).
70. Id. In larger counties, the data represents a random sample; in other counties, the data
covers all trials taking place during the time period. Id.
71. Exxon Shipping, 128 S. Ct. at 2625.
72. Id. The Court also points to the corresponding numbers for judge-awarded punitive damages: where the median punitive-compensatory ratio is 0.66:1; mean is 1.60; and standard deviation is 4.54. Id.
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and concludes, on the basis of these figures, that the answer is “no.”73 The
Court is confident that “[e]ven to those of us unsophisticated in statistics,
the thrust of these figures is clear: the spread is great, and the outlier cases
subject defendants to punitive damages that dwarf the corresponding
compensatories.”74
What is fairly astounding at this juncture is the fact that, with this
statistical analysis, the Court managed to provoke vehement criticisms from
both camps in the punitive damages empirical debate. Indeed, amidst a raging debate regarding premises, relevant data sources, methodologies, and
conclusions in the empirical scholarship, the single point of agreement
seems to be that the Court erred.75 First, there is an unsettling circularity in
the Court’s reasoning. The Court begins from the premise that the punitive
damages remedy is plagued by inherent unpredictability. But if that is so,
then it is strange that the Court would rely on data of aggregate actual punitive damages (by assumption, tainted by unpredictability) to set benchmarks
for the award of future punitive damages. In other words, having questioned
the soundness of the existing schemes for awarding punitive damages, the
Court then uses data drawn from these awards to set guidelines for future
punitive damages awards.76 This circularity problem has received quite a bit
of attention in the literature, as it impacts upon the feasibility of establishing
damages “schedules” to guide the jury in awarding damages—which have
been proposed to rein in both punitive damages and noneconomic compensatory damages.77
The Court, moreover, draws questionable statistical inferences from
the aggregate jury data. The Court made no attempt to disaggregate the
underlying factors leading to what it deemed unacceptable variability and
spread in the data (as evidenced by a large mean and standard deviation, as
compared to the median).78 In fact, it turns out that the spread in the ratio of
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 17 (critiquing the Court’s use of median ratios of
punitive to compensatory damages as a basis for setting an upper bound for punitive damages
awards); Eisenberg et al., Exxon, supra note 57 (arguing that the authors’ empirical findings do
not support the Court’s concern about unpredictability).
76. Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 17, at 2 (“The rationale for setting any specific value or
range of values for the relationship between punitive awards and compensatory awards follows a
rather baffling circular reasoning in that it questions the soundness of current punitive damages
awards while at the same time using statistics drawn from these awards to set guidelines for future
punitive damages awards.”).
77. See Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling “Pain and
Suffering”, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 908, 938 (1989) (proposing “comprehensive scheduling” as a
reform for valuing noneconomic compensatory damages); Mark Geistfeld, Placing a Price on
Pain and Suffering: A Method for Helping Juries Determine Tort Damages for Nonmonetary
Injuries, 83 CAL. L. REV. 773, 791–93 (1995) (criticizing reliance on schedules for pain-andsuffering damages).
78. There is a separate methodological critique here. Hersch and Viscusi argue that the
Court’s conclusion about unpredictability “ignores the quite legitimate reasons for why the mean
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punitive to compensatory damages is a function of the size of the compensatory damages. Ted Eisenberg reanalyzed the same data used by the Court.
He stratified punitive damages by the size of the accompanying compensatory damage award: (1) $0 to $999; (2) $1,000 to $9,999; (3) $10,000 to
$99,999; (4) $100,000 to $999,999; (5) $1,000,000 to $9,999,999; (6)
$10,000,000 to $99,999,999; and (7) $100,000,000 or more.79 Eisenberg’s
statistical analysis demonstrates that all of the high-mean, high-standard
deviation contribution to the mean and standard deviation statistics used by
the Court is attributable to cases in which the compensatory damages were
less than $10,000.80 In other words, this category of cases, with very low
compensatory damages, is responsible for the entirety of the variability and
spread in the aggregate data that the Court picks up. But this is an extremely
troubling finding given that the low compensatory damages cases are precisely those in which the Court has recognized that larger ratios may be
entirely appropriate.81 If the unpredictability in the data is cabined to these
low compensatory damages cases, then the Court’s diagnosis of the general
unpredictability in the punitive-compensatory ratio is off-base.82
C. Solution: 1:1 Ratio
Undeterred by its rudimentary understanding of statistics, and with undue confidence in its diagnosis of the root unpredictability problem infecting punitive damages awards, the Court proceeds to outline a solution to
the problem. En route, the Court canvases “three basic approaches,” one
verbal and two quantitative. The Court is pessimistic about the prospects of
any verbal approach. States have outlined different factors for courts to use
when conducting appellate review of punitive damages verdicts, such as
culpability, likelihood of detection, and financial gain.83 And, at the trial
might exceed the median,” explaining that it is not surprising that the mean ratio is greater than
the median ratio, given that “[t]he distribution of possible ratios is truncated from below at zero so
that one would expect a relatively longer upper tail of the distribution.” Hersch & Viscusi, supra
note 17, at 10.
79. Eisenberg et al., Exxon, supra note 57, at 15.
80. Id. at 16.
81. BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 582 (1996); State Farm v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425
(2003).
82. Nor does this mean that unpredictability may not be at the root of a different issue.
Hersch and Viscusi argue that “blockbuster” awards—that is, awards of at least $100 million—are
poorly represented within the Civil Justice Survey datasets, and that if “the Court used the blockbuster cases as the reference point, it would have reached a quite different assessment of the ratio
of punitive damages to compensatory damages.” Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 17, at 13–14; see
also Viscusi, The Blockbuster Punitive Damages Awards, supra note 55 (reporting the list of all
blockbuster cases through 2003). But see Eisenberg & Wells, supra note 57 (arguing that a strong
association exists between blockbuster punitive damages awards and compensatory damages
awards).
83. See, e.g., Bowden v. Caldor, Inc., 710 A.2d 267, 277–84 (Md. 1998) (stating nine review
factors including “degree of heinousness” and “the deterrence value of the amount awarded”);
Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So. 2d 218, 223–24 (Ala. 1989) (stating seven general criteria,
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level, states provide pattern jury instructions. But, as the Court notes, jury
instructions typically provide scant specific guidance.84 In the end, the
Court concludes that “[i]nstructions can go just so far in promoting systemic consistency when awards are not tied to specifically proven items of
damage (the cost of medical treatment, say).”85
The Court then turns to consider quantitative approaches. States have
experimented with two basic types of limits on punitive damages—hard
dollar caps and punitive-compensatory ratios or maximum multipliers.86
The Court is less sanguine about the former approach, given the need for
ongoing adjustments due to inflation and changing circumstances—tasks
far better suited for a legislature than for a court.87 The Court settles on the
ratio approach.88 At this point, alchemy seems to guide the Court towards
the precise 1:1 ratio. Whereas most states adopt either a 3:1 or 2:1 ratio, the
Court is worried that such ratios include the most egregious cases as well as
the “run of the mill” punitive damages cases.89 Given the Court’s view that
Exxon’s conduct was reprehensible, but not willful and wanton, the Court is
hesitant to adopt such a range.90 Coincidentally, it settles on the same 1:1
ratio to which it was attracted in its earlier constitutional due process
cases.91 The choice also rests heavily on the Court’s (misguided) statistical
analysis—thus blurring the divide between the Court’s policy-driven analysis and its constitutional review of punitive damages.92
including “the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct,” whether “the wrongful conduct was profitable to the defendant,” and the “financial position of the defendant”); see also Neil
Vidmar & Matthew W. Wolfe, Fairness Through Guidance: Jury Instruction on Punitive Damages After Philip Morris v. Williams, 2 CHARLESTON L. REV. 307, 316–24 (2008) (explaining that
jury instructions after Williams “offered only the most general guidelines” for awarding punitive
damages, and proposing model written instructions for punitive damages).
84. In Alabama, for example, the jury is told to consider “the character and degree of the
wrong as shown by the evidence in the case, and the necessity of preventing similar wrongs.”
Exxon Shipping, 128 S. Ct. at 2627–28 (citing 1 ALA. PATTERN JURY INSTR., CIVIL, NO. § 23.21
(Supp. 2007)). In Maryland, juries are told that a punitive damages award should be: “[i]n an
amount that will deter the defendant and others from similar conduct,” and “[p]roportionate to the
wrongfulness of the defendant’s conduct and the defendant’s ability to pay,” but not “designed to
bankrupt or financially destroy a defendant.” Id. at 2627 (citing MD. CIVIL PATTERN JURY INSTR.,
Civil, No. 10:13 (4th ed. 2007)).
85. Id. at 2628. Notwithstanding the Court’s pessimism, some commentators remain
steadfast in their conviction that detailed written jury instructions could solve the unpredictability
problem. See, e.g., Vidmar & Wolfe, supra note 83, at 318–24.
86. See Catherine M. Sharkey & Jonathan Klick, The Fungibility of Damage Awards: Punitive Damage Caps and Substitution 31–33 (Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper No.
298, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=912256 (providing comprehensive lists of both
types of state punitive damages limitations).
87. Exxon Shipping, 128 S. Ct. at 2629.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 2631.
90. Id. at 2631–32.
91. Id. at 2633; see supra note 11 and accompanying text.
92. See Exxon Shipping, 128 S. Ct. at 2632–33.
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In reaching its solution, the Court evokes a comparison with criminal
sentencing guidelines. According to the Court, “[t]he points of similarity
[with criminal sentencing] are obvious.”93 The Court lauds the move over
the past twenty-five years from an “indeterminate” system to a “system of
detailed guidelines tied to exactly quantified sentencing results” and seems
to encourage states in that direction.94 To the Court’s mind, little separates
punitive damages from criminal fines and penalties; so the guidelines solution for restraining discretion in the criminal context would seem to apply
full force in the civil context. Leaving to one side the myriad questions and
criticisms regarding the efficacy of the guidelines solution in the criminal
sentencing context,95 what is perhaps most astonishing (although less readily perceptible) is how the Court seizes the reins to define the legitimate
state interest in punitive damages: retributive punishment.
III. LOOMING ISSUES
In making its pronouncements regarding punitive damages as a common law remedy, the Court raised more questions than it answered. How
far would its zeal to control unpredictability in the civil justice system be
taken? What to make of the seemingly unique procedural feature of the
Exxon Shipping case, where the plaintiffs were bound together in a
mandatory punitive damages class action? And, finally, what are the implications for the Court’s having elevated a singular goal (retributive punishment) of punitive damages, by equating punitive damages and criminal
sentencing, for future state judicial and legislative responses?
A. Unpredictability
The U.S. Supreme Court’s diagnosis of the core ill of punitive damages as inherent unpredictability can be linked to the Court’s broader project of reining in the vagaries of jury decisionmaking via procedural reform
93. Id. at 2628.
94. Id.; see also Jeffrey L. Fisher, The Exxon Valdez Case and Regularizing Punishment, 26
ALASKA L. REV. 1, 39–43 (2009) (explaining that states may set up such guidelines which, in the
end, would allow state courts to uphold larger ratios of punitive damages to compensatory damages); Leo M. Romero, Punishment for Ecological Disasters: Punitive Damages and/or Criminal
Sanctions, 7 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 154, 170–73 (2009).
95. See, e.g., Douglas A. Berman, Distinguishing Offense Conduct and Offender Characteristics in Modern Sentencing Reforms, 58 STAN. L. REV. 277, 280–85, 288–91 (2005) (lamenting
that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines limited judges’ opportunity to consider offender characteristics in sentencing, and proposing reforms that would decrease the Guidelines’ emphasis on “offense conduct”); Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable
Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1683–84 (1992) (criticizing the Federal Sentencing Guidelines for not providing discretion to “judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys,
and probation officers, [who] find themselves torn between allegiance to rigid rules and an urge to
do justice in individual cases”).
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in civil litigation.96 The unpredictability diagnosis has profound implications, if taken to its logical end. Surely, the same unpredictability that taints
the jury’s punitive damages decision-making process would surface in the
jury’s determination of noneconomic compensatory damages, such as painand-suffering damages. Indeed, in one case before the Washington Court of
Appeals, a party attempted (ultimately unsuccessfully) to cite Exxon Shipping to call into question general damages, as opposed to specific damages.97 Such challenges to noneconomic damages may proliferate. These
“soft” damages have long been the target of various reforms, such as refined jury instructions and damages schedules, aimed at tempering wide
variation in similar cases.98 But recall the U.S. Supreme Court’s skepticism
towards jury instructions in realms where award amounts are not tied to
specifically proven damages, such as the medical costs and lost wages components of economic compensatory damages.99 Is the Court giving a tacit
endorsement of damages schedules in the realm of noneconomic compensatory damages? How far would the Court push its encouragement of the
sentencing guidelines model? One could draw a sharp criminal-civil distinction, with punitive damages falling on the criminal side of the line, and
noneconomic compensatory damages remaining firmly on the civil.100 Of
course, in the constitutional due process cases, the domain of the Court’s
intervention is limited to what it perceives as the quasi-criminal realm of
punitive damages.
96. Notably, Justice Souter, author of the majority opinion in Exxon Shipping, also penned
the majority opinions in two seminal opinions that likewise had the effect of removing decisionmaking authority from the jury in particular areas of the law. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372, 388 (1996) (holding that the construction of a patent claim is
“exclusively within the province of the court” on the ground that “judges, not juries, are the better
suited to find the acquired meaning of patent terms”); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555–58 (2007) (articulating a heightened “plausibility” standard for antitrust conspiracy
claims to withstand dismissal). See also Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the
“Litigation Explosion,” “Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Cliches Eroding Our Day in Court and
Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982 (2003) (arguing that “invocations of complexity
or uniformity exceptions or assumptions as to efficiency and policy preferences, let alone resort to
the ‘litigation explosion’ and ‘liability crisis’ bromides, as rationales for limiting access to trial
and jury adjudication must be cabined”).
97. Rosander v. Nightrunners, 196 P.3d 711, 719 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008). The court did not
accept this argument, however, explaining that because Exxon Shipping ruled only “on limits of
punitive damages only under maritime law” it was inapposite. Id.
98. See, e.g., Catherine M. Sharkey, Unintended Consequences of Medical Malpractice
Damages Caps, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 391, 396–417 (2005) (providing a survey of medical malpractice damages caps); Geistfeld, supra note 77 (recommending that juries assess damages for pain
and suffering through an ex ante perspective, asking how much they would pay to eliminate the
risk that caused the injury); Bovbjerg et al., supra note 77 (proposing “alternative frameworks to
perfect the valuation of non-economic damages,” including “comprehensive scheduling”).
99. See supra notes 84–85 and accompanying text.
100. Or, alternatively, the Court could recognize the retributive-nonretributive distinction emphasized by my account of punitive damages. See Sharkey, supra note 17, at 356–72; Sharkey,
supra note 27, at 470–71; see also Colby, supra note 53, at 455 n.281.
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But, unpredictability cuts across both spheres and would suggest a far
wider damages reform agenda.101 Moreover, as a policy matter, the prospects of combating unpredictability with a single-minded focus on a single
category of damages (punitive damages) are dim, particularly in light of the
fungibility of damages categories. Emerging empirical (and anecdotal) evidence confirms a substitution effect—efforts to restrain punitive damages
via caps and limits lead to increases in compensatory damages (primarily in
the noneconomic, pain-and-suffering categories).102 This substitution effect
would predict that, given the Court’s heightened attention to the ratio of
punitive to compensatory damages, plaintiffs and their attorneys would
devote additional resources and effort to bolstering the compensatory
denominator.103
B. Punitive Damages and Class Actions
Exxon Shipping provided the U.S. Supreme Court with a unique platform to address the issue of punitive damages as a common law remedy
given the jurisdictional posture as a federal admiralty case. Exxon Shipping
was unique on another dimension as well: unlike the previous constitutional
due process cases, each of which in essence involved a single plaintiff raising an individual claim against the defendant, in Exxon Shipping, the plaintiffs were part of a mandatory, non-opt-out punitive damages class.104 The
issue of the classwide award of punitive damages was not front and center
before the Court, but it lurks in the background as a reminder of the unaddressed link between punitive damages and class actions.105
101. See Mark Geistfeld, Constitutional Tort Reform, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1093, 1094 (2005)
(arguing that while constitutional tort reform has been limited to punitive damages, “[o]ther important tort practices raise the same sort of due process concerns,” which means that “[t]he
Court’s punitive damages jurisprudence may . . . provide the foundation for a new type of broadbased tort reform”); Sharkey, supra note 56, at 398–407 (critiquing the broad reform agenda embraced by Sunstein et al. in How Juries Decide, which included “the expulsion of the jury from the
punitive damages determination,” and suggesting that the authors’ empirical findings about the
jury’s inability to “translate” retribution into punitive damages would seem to raise similar concerns about noneconomic compensatory damages).
102. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Crossing the Punitive-Compensatory Divide, in CIVIL JURIES
AND CIVIL JUSTICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 79 (Brian Bornstein et al. ed.,
2008); Sharkey & Klick, supra note 86.
103. See Sharkey, supra note 102, at 80–104 (uncovering judicial recognition of “substitution”
and describing experimental mock jury studies that provide empirical evidence about the phenomenon); Sharkey & Klick, supra note 86, at 5–20 (finding that existence of caps on punitive damages are associated with increases in compensatory damage awards).
104. Judge Jack Weinstein was an innovator with respect to certifying a mandatory punitive
damages class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1)(B) in the Agent Orange litigation.
See In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718, 728 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (“There must . . .
be some limit, either as a matter of policy or as a matter of due process, to the amount of times
defendants may be punished for a single transaction.”), mandamus denied sub nom. In re Diamond
Shamrock Chem. Co., 725 F.2d 858 (2d Cir. 1984).
105. Sharkey, supra note 17, at 402–14; Elizabeth Cabraser & Robert Nelson, Class Action
Treatment of Punitive Damages Issues After Philip Morris v. Williams: We Can Get There from
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In Exxon Shipping, defendant Exxon specifically requested certification of a mandatory, non-opt-out class of more than 32,000 commercial
fisherman, Native Alaskan, and landowner plaintiffs for the purpose of determining punitive damages.106 Exxon argued that the proposed class satisfied Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1)(B), which is premised upon
the existence of a “limited fund” out of which all claims must be satisfied,
such that the resolution of individual class members’ claims would inevitably affect the disposition of other members’ claims.107 Exxon premised its
argument on the “limited punishment” theory—namely, that constitutional
due process imposes an upper limit on the total aggregate amount of punitive damages Exxon faces for a single act, such that “if one jury has made
an award of punitive damages in an amount such that . . . it equals the
amount necessary to accomplish the goals of punishment and deterrence,
then subsequent juries may not make additional awards of punitive damages
without infringing the substantive limitations on punitive damages set by
the due process clause.”108 Notwithstanding plaintiffs’ opposition,109 the
federal district court approved the mandatory punitive damages class, accepting Exxon’s argument that “due process places a limit on punitive damHere, 2 CHARLESTON L. REV. 407, 409 (2008) (arguing that in cases where there are many victims, the punitive and deterrent purposes of punitive damages may be achieved through class
actions).
106. See Class Action Counterclaim for Declaratory Relief, In re the Exxon Valdez, No. A89095-CV (D. Alaska Jan. 28, 1994).
107. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B) (justifying class action in situations where alternative
individual actions present a risk of “adjudications with respect to individual members of the class
which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties
to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests”).
108. Class Action Counterclaim for Declaratory Relief, supra note 106, at 9. Exxon
elaborated:
Multiple punitive damages trials thus mean that the action of one jury (in the first case
to go to judgment) will necessarily affect the amount of the award that can be made to
class members in all subsequent trials, and (if the award by the first jury is sufficiently
large) may prevent subsequent juries from awarding any punitive damages at all. All or
most of the constitutionally permissible punitive damages would be awarded to class
members who were parties to the first trial, while class members who are participants in
subsequent trials will receive either a reduced amount, or nothing.
Id. at 9–10.
109. See, e.g., Plaintiffs’ Joint Memorandum in Opposition to “Motion of Defendants Exxon
Corporation (D-1) and Exxon Shipping Company (D-2) for Leave to File Class Action Counterclaim” and in Opposition to “Motion by Defendants and Counterclaimants Exxon Corporation (D1) and Exxon Shipping Company (D-2) to Certify Mandatory Punitive Damage Class Pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B)” at 2, In re the Exxon Valdez, No. A-89-095-CV (D. Alaska, Feb. 11,
1994) (arguing that the court did not have discretion to certify a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) punitive damages class because Exxon’s “limited punishment” theory was “contrary to settled law, and application of it here would violate the Anti-Injunction Act”); State Court Plaintiffs’ Amicus Curiae Brief
in Opposition to Exxon Corporation’s and Exxon Shipping Company’s Motion to Certify
Mandatory Punitive Damage Class Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B) at 5–6, In re the Exxon
Valdez, No. A-89-095-CV (D. Alaska, Feb. 11, 1994) (“Subjecting Exxon to a punitive damages
trial in state court as well as in federal court does not violate due process, because both courts
have in place procedures to ensure the awards are not excessive.”).
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ages and, in substance creates a limited fund from which punitive damages
may be awarded.”110
Classwide determination of punitive damages is a controversial notion,
albeit one typically staunchly resisted by defendants. Plaintiffs tried such a
maneuver in the tobacco context, arguing that the existence of a due process
limit on total punitive damages created a limited fund, thus fitting the model
of the mandatory, non-opt-out class action.111 But, in In re Simon II, the
Second Circuit rejected the creative attempt, suggesting that certifying a
punitive damages class was “putting the cart before the horse,” and inappropriate given the necessity of determining individualized compensatory damages as an initial matter.112
Defendant’s strategy in Exxon Shipping was quite distinct from that of
the tobacco defendants—or any of the defendants involved in the singleplaintiff cases previously before the U.S. Supreme Court. Exxon Shipping
represents the paradigm of the single-event mass disaster affecting myriad
potential plaintiffs. The “singular nature of the spill” created a “unique and
compelling” case for mandatory certification of a punitive damages class.113
As the federal district court reasoned, “[t]hese cases are not spread all over
the country where the different laws of many states would apply—as in a
product liability situation. In the case at bar, the logistics of compliance
with the requirements of Rule 23(b)(1)(B) are much simpler because of the
singular nature of the spill.”114 In sharp contrast, the paradigm of the previous constitutional due process trilogy of cases before the U.S. Supreme
Court was that of a single products liability plaintiff raising, in essence, a
claim for classwide punitive damages, with the threat that future individual
plaintiffs could seek punitive damages for similar wrongful conduct.115
110. Order No. 180 Supplement (Decision Regarding Certification of Mandatory Punitive
Damages Class) at 9, In re the Exxon Valdez, No. A-89-095-CV (D. Alaska, Mar. 8, 1994) (explaining the court’s reasons for granting conditional preliminary approval for certification of a
mandatory punitive damages class); see also Order No. 204 Supplement (Final Certification of
Mandatory Punitive Damage Class) at 6, In re the Exxon Valdez, No. A-89-095-CV (D. Alaska,
Apr. 15, 1994) (explaining the court’s reasons for granting final approval of the mandatory punitive damages class, and stating that “the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment also
imposes substantive limits on punitive damages”). In Order No. 204 Supplement, the court added
that “[t]he objectors [to the court’s preliminary approval for certification] have failed to convince
the court that a mandatory punitive damages class is not the surest and most direct means of
limiting punitive damages to those necessary to punish and deter and to limit punitive damages to
those which are constitutionally permissible.” Id.
111. In re Simon II, 407 F.3d 125, 127 (2d Cir. 2005).
112. Id. at 138.
113. Decision Regarding Certification of Mandatory Punitive Damages Class, supra note 110,
at 10 (“The reasons for certifying a punitive damages class under a ‘limited punishment’ theory
are, perhaps, more unique and compelling in this case than in any other. Unlike the majority of
mass tort class actions, this case involves an unusual convergence of identity of occurrence, law,
and fact.”).
114. Id. at 10–11.
115. See Sharkey, supra note 17, at 350 (“State Farm represents an emerging paradigm in
punitive damages cases: a single or multiplaintiff case in which, in effect, ‘classwide’ punitive
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The Court has yet to address the link between punitive damages and
class actions.116 In its trilogy of due process cases, the Court has been concerned about the “multiple punitive damages problem”—namely that a single defendant would be called upon to pay punitive damages over and over
for the same wrongdoing.117 The Court responded by trying to limit the
punitive damages in each case to the specific harm directed to the particular
plaintiff in the case.118 The Court, moreover, has cautioned lower courts to
be on guard against allowing juries to award punitive damages on account
of harms to others.119
But this particular problem could have been addressed if the Court
recognized and endorsed the “limited punishment” punitive damages class
action, whereby all the affected individuals would be before the Court as
absent class members.120 In other words, if the problem is that of awarding
classwide damages in a single-plaintiff case, then the solution of the punitive damages class presents itself. The class action solution, moreover,
would mitigate the Court’s concern about unpredictability. Treating similarly-situated plaintiffs as a class eliminates the possibility of inconsistent
verdicts across those similarly-situated plaintiffs.
But, as Francis McGovern reminds, “[b]y most conventional wisdom,
there is little future for plaintiffs or defendants who desire to resolve punitive damages claims globally using the procedural vehicle of a class action.”121 The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Ortiz v. Fibreboard122
damages are assessed on a statewide or nationwide scale.”); see also Richard A. Nagareda, Embedded Aggregation in Civil Litigation, 95 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming Sept. 2010), draft at
5–6, 22–40, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1506460 (analyzing
Williams as an example of “embedded aggregation,” a case where an individual litigation implicates the rights of nonparties).
116. See, e.g., Sharkey, supra note 17, at 430, 431–32 (“The Supreme Court, while demonstrating grave fear of the extraterritorial scope of punishment, has not expressed similar misgivings about the scope of remediation with respect to class action lawsuits extending to citizens of
more than one state, at least so long as the requirements of Rule 23 are met. . . . Moreover, lower
federal courts may increasingly push the Court toward reconciling its principles of extraterritoriality in the punitive damages and class action spheres.”).
117. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 423 (2003) (explaining
that punishment based on “[a] defendant’s dissimilar acts, independent from the acts upon which
liability was premised . . . . creates the possibility of multiple punitive damages awards for the
same conduct; for in the usual case nonparties are not bound by the judgment some other plaintiff
obtains”); BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 593 (1996) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“Larger damages
might also ‘double count’ by including in the punitive damages award some of the compensatory,
or punitive, damages that subsequent plaintiffs would also recover.”).
118. See Gore, 517 U.S. at 582, 585; Campbell, 538 U.S. at 423–24.
119. See Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 357–58 (2007).
120. This doctrinal choice, moreover, would require the Court to construe Rule 23(b)(1)(B) as
capacious enough to embrace the punitive-damages class action. See infra text accompanying
notes 121–23.
121. Francis E. McGovern, Punitive Damages and Class Actions, 70 LA. L. REV. 435, 435
(2010); see also Colby, supra note 15, at 662–63 (arguing that “there are a number of significant
impediments to the use of the class action device to resolve punitive damages claims arising out of
a single course of conduct,” including the fact that “even where the defendant’s conduct was
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clamps down significantly on adventuresome applications of Rule
23(b)(1)(B), and signals strong bias against class certification and in favor
of individual litigation in future mass torts.123
The ability to certify a punitive damages class going forward rests
upon a distinctly societal notion of punitive damages.124 There is much to
recommend such a characterization: individual plaintiffs have no vested entitlement or right to punitive damages, as opposed to compensatory damages.125 Indeed, the state can take away a portion of the punitive damages
award for use in the treasury or a specified fund; punitive damages, moreover, are taxed, whereas compensatory damages are not.126
But, in its due process punitive damages jurisprudence, the Court has
insisted upon the individual retributive nature of punitive damages, with its
most emphatic statement in Williams.127 Richard Nagareda, among others,
has argued that Williams is at fundamental odds with certification of classwide punitive damages.128 The Court did not have to confront this tension
identical with respect to all victims (which is often not the case), individual issues (including
causation and the amount of both compensatory and punitive damages) will tend to predominate,
again making a class action unworkable”).
122. 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
123. See RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT 73–94 (2007);
McGovern, supra note 121, at 449 (“The opponents of class action treatment of the asbestos
personal injury cases were drawn from both the left and right of the political spectrum, and they
joined in promoting a more deontological approach with the fundamental principle that personal
injury lawsuits were, indeed, personal and that the individual aspects of lawsuits were not
fungible.”).
124. See, e.g., In re Simon II, 211 F.R.D. 86, 104 (E.D.N.Y. 2002), rev’d 407 F.3d 125 (2d
Cir. 2005) (“[T]he punitive award can be said to constitute a punishment on behalf of society
. . . .”); see also Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Unfinished Business: Reaching the Due Process Limits of
Punitive Damages in Tobacco Litigation Through Unitary Classwide Adjudication, 36 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 979, 980–81 (2001) (“Punitive damages stand as a civil penalty for transgression
of the social compact . . . . to penalize conduct that violates the social contract and injures society.”); Sharkey, supra note 17, at 413 (“We might consider whether a class of plaintiffs can itself
serve as a proxy for society, or at least for a wider societal group.”); McGovern, supra note 121, at
462 (“[A]nother possible role for a class action in punitive damages cases could materialize if a
court adopted a separate rationale for punitive damages based upon economic arguments that
damages for tortious conduct should be fully borne by the tortfeasor in order to achieve optimal
societal deterrence.”).
125. See, e.g., Sharkey, supra note 17, at 437 (“The fact that plaintiffs have no vested right to
punitive damages—which, after all (at least in most states), are assessed to punish and to deter the
defendant, not to compensate the plaintiff in any fashion—remains a formidable barrier to any
takings challenge.”); Dunn v. Hovic, 1 F.3d 1371, 1402 (3d Cir. 1993) (“[P]unitive awards are
windfalls and not compensation [and] courts should place less emphasis on plaintiffs’ rights when
evaluating due process arguments. Plaintiffs’ entitlements are, after all, met by compensatory
damages.”).
126. See Sharkey, supra note 17, at 375–80 (describing split-recovery statutes, where the state
takes away a portion of the punitive damages award).
127. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 353–55 (2007); State Farm Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 422–23 (2003).
128. See, e.g., Nagareda, supra note 115, draft at 31–32 (“By casting punitive damages ultimately as punishment vis-à-vis the plaintiff — not anyone else — the [Williams] Court effectively
constitutionalizes a kind of divisible characterization for that remedy. As such, punitive damages
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in Exxon Shipping, given that the issue of classwide determination of punitive damages was not before it on appeal.129 And, in fact, the Court steered
clear of even mentioning this unique dimension of the case.130 Here is an
example where the Court’s constitutional jurisprudence potentially clashes
with a public-policy inflected solution. The Court’s insistence upon the individual nature of punitive damages blurs the distinction—and leads us to
the final looming issue: the increasing federalization of punitive damages
by the U.S. Supreme Court.
C. Federalization of Punitive Damages
A distinctive feature of U.S. Supreme Court due process review of
punitive damages is the extent to which the Court provides the sole avenue
of federal court review of state court judgments. In this vein, Justice Ginsburg has remarked that “unlike federal habeas corpus review of state-court
convictions under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the Court ‘work[s] at this business of
[checking state courts] alone,’ unaided by the participation of federal district courts and courts of appeals.”131 The Court’s inherent limited ability to
police voluminous state court punitive damages judgments is an animating
force behind the Court’s seizure of Exxon Shipping as a template for lower
courts to follow. Acting in the unique (for the U.S. Supreme Court) posture
of a common law court, the Court provides a generalized model for lower
courts, hoping to persuade by example.
By presenting a template to be emulated by the lower courts, the Court
plays a harmonization role, in effect smoothing out state-by-state differare no more amenable to class treatment than demands for the prototypical divisible remedy of
compensatory damages.”).
129. Because the procedural issue was not before the Court, Exxon Shipping cannot be taken
as any kind of endorsement of classwide treatment of punitive damages. The district court’s class
certification, moreover, predates the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.,
527 U.S. 815 (1999), which presents formidable obstacles to certification. But see McGovern,
supra note 121, at 445 (“[Exxon Shipping] provides at least one scenario in which there can be a
punitive damages class action. . . . Looking to the future, there may be scenarios like Exxon that
will occur.”).
130. The Court’s opinion, in fact, reads as if there is no appreciable difference between the
mandatory punitive class of plaintiffs and a single-plaintiff case. Given the Court’s previous interest in the “multiple punitive damages” conundrum, coupled with the Court’s broad foray into
policy-laden analysis of punitive damages as a common law remedy, the lack of attention is
disconcerting.
During oral argument, there was only a single colloquy regarding the topic. Justice Ginsburg
asked counsel for respondents: “[A]re there other cases against Exxon seeking compensation and
punitive damages based on this oil spill that are still awaiting trial or decision? Or is this it?”
Transcript of Oral Argument at 77, Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008) (No. 07219). When counsel replied that “[b]y definition, this is a mandatory punitive class, so this is the
one and only time Exxon will face . . . punitive damages,” id., Justice Ginsburg alluded to the
multiple punishments problem: “So you don’t have the problem of litigant A getting these punitive damages and then B, C and D all wanting to [bring additional actions].” Id.
131. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 431 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S.
559, 613 (1996)) (alteration in original).
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ences. But the Court’s federalization project goes even further. Exxon Shipping represents the culmination of the Court’s process of reflection upon the
core purpose of punitive damages. The Court provides its most fulsome
equation of punitive damages and individual retributive punishment.132
Whereas in its previous due process cases, the Court equivocated between
economic deterrence goals and retributive punishment goals,133 in Exxon
Shipping, the Court sets out its task as defining “the place of punishment in
modern civil law.”134 The Court is clearer than it has been in the past that
the goal of punitive damages is punishment, with only an incidental aim of
deterrence. According to the Court: “We have tied [the constitutional due
process] limit to a conception of punitive damages awarded entirely for a
punitive, not quasi-compensatory purpose.”135 The facts of Exxon Shipping
lend themselves to the Court’s characterization. Given the myriad government enforcers and private parties involved, punitive damages are not necessary to serve as an incentive to sue.136 Nor, given the open and notorious
nature of the oil spill, is underdetection—the primary focus of the economic
deterrence rational—a plausible concern.137 But, the Court’s shaping of punitive damages doctrine extends beyond the boundaries of Exxon Shipping.
It is worth highlighting that, at the same time the Court has pressed the
single-minded retributive characterization of punitive damages, the Court
has been careful to acknowledge in its due process cases that it begins with
the state’s own articulation of its legitimate state interest in punitive damages. Thus, in Exxon Shipping, the Court acknowledges that “[s]tate regulation of punitive damages varies.”138 The Court’s single-minded focus on the
retributive punishment goal of punitive damages then sets the stage for a
federalism clash, to the extent that it treads upon alternative legitimate state
132. Sharkey, supra note 17, at 359–63, 389–414 (explaining that “[t]he prevailing justification for punitive damages is individually oriented, retributive punishment” and describing an alternative justification based on a societal notion of punitive damages).
133. Gore, 517 U.S. at 568; Campbell, 538 U.S. at 416; Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549
U.S. 346, 352 (2007).
134. Exxon Shipping, 128 S. Ct. at 2620.
135. Id. at 2633.
136. See Sharkey, supra note 17, at 442 (“[I]n addition to the vast amount of compensatory
damages to the numerous parties directly harmed by its actions, Exxon faced the possibility of
paying more than $5 billion in criminal and civil penalties for the spill. Exxon pleaded guilty to
five criminal counts, potentially subjecting it to $5.1 billion in fines. And the company could have
been assessed civil fines of about $64 million by the state and federal governments for its spilled
oil. Instead, in a settlement with the federal and state governments, Exxon paid a $25 million
criminal fine, plus $100 million in restitution.”).
137. Lower courts have seized on this distinction, finding larger than 1:1 punitive-compensatory ratios to be warranted in instances where either compensatory damages are too low to provide
enough incentive to sue or where wrongdoing is difficult to detect, and citing Exxon Shipping
approvingly. See, e.g., Kunz v. DeFelice, 538 F.3d 667, 679 (7th Cir. 2008); Valarie v. Michigan
Dept. of Corr., 2008 WL 4939951, at *8–9 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 17, 2008); Green v. Denny’s Corp.,
2008 WL 4328221, at *2 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 8, 2008); Hayduk v. City of Johnstown, 580 F. Supp. 2d
429, 483 n.46 (W.D. Pa. 2008).
138. Exxon Shipping, 128 S. Ct. at 2622.
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interests in punitive damages. Consider in this regard states that define a
legitimate non-retributive purpose for punitive damages: Michigan provides
“exemplary damages” for compensatory purposes; Connecticut allows punitive damages to stand in for attorneys’ fees.139 I have also raised the issue
whether split-recovery statutes, which direct a portion of punitive damages
judgments to the state or state-run fund, could be reformulated to embody a
non-retributive, societal purpose for punitive damages.140
Such non-retributive state interests in punitive damages certainly go
against the grain of the U.S. Supreme Court’s individual retributive punishment drumbeat. But, given the Court’s acknowledgement of the federalism
interests at stake, I do not think the Court would trample upon them lightly
should it be faced with a direct clash. As I elaborate in a separate article,
two potential avenues for state legislative articulation of nonretributive purposes for punitive damages are split-recovery statutes and statutory multiple
damages.141 The extent to which states force the Court to confront this
looming federalism issue remains to be seen.
CONCLUSION
Exxon Shipping brought a two-decade long litigation to rest.142 With
its decision in Exxon Shipping, the U.S. Supreme Court broke free of the
mold of its past constitutional due process review cases and charted a different path of common law excessiveness review under federal admiralty
law. The Court’s present punitive damages strategy is embodied in the decision: acting akin to a common law court, the Court provided a template for
lower courts to follow. Free of constitutional constraints, the Court conceives of punitive damages as a common law remedy. The Court proceeds
139. B&B Inv. Group v. Gitler, 581 N.W.2d 17, 20 (Mich. App. 1998) (“[E]xemplary damage
awards in intentional tort cases have been considered proper if they compensate a plaintiff for the
humiliation, sense of outrage, and indignity resulting from injuries maliciously, willfully and wantonly inflicted by the defendant.”); Harty v. Cantor Fitzgerald & Co., 881 A.2d 139, 153 (Conn.
2005) (explaining that punitive damages “are restricted to cost of litigation less taxable costs of
the action being tried and not that of any former trial”).
140. See Sharkey, supra note 17, at 375–88 (providing a description of split-recovery statutes
and exploring “the idea—implicit in them—that punitive damages vindicate societal, as opposed
to individual, interests”).
141. See Sharkey, supra note 27.
142. Well, not entirely. The U.S. Supreme Court remanded the Exxon Shipping case to the
Ninth Circuit “to decide issues related to interest and appellate costs.” Exxon Valdez v. Exxon
Mobil, 568 F.3d 1077, 1079 (9th Cir. 2009). The Ninth Circuit concluded that because the plaintiffs’ entitlement to punitive damages was “meaningfully ascertained” at the time of the original
judgment in 1996, the plaintiffs were entitled to interest from that date (as opposed to 2008, when
judgment was entered following Exxon Shipping). Id. at 1080. And the court required each party
to bear its own costs, in keeping with the Ninth Circuit’s “usual practice when each side wins
something and loses something.” Id. Exxon acquiesced and paid the court-ordered interest on the
judgment, but challenged the costs determination, filing a petition for rehearing en banc with the
Ninth Circuit, which was rejected. After contemplating a further petition to the U.S. Supreme
Court, Exxon relented and paid the costs. See Exxon Qualified Settlement Fund,
www.exspill.com.

\\server05\productn\U\UST\7-1\UST102.txt

54

unknown

Seq: 30

UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL

14-MAY-10

8:40

[Vol. 7:1

to diagnose a problem—unpredictability—and propose a solution: a 1:1 ratio of punitive to compensatory damages. The flaws in the Court’s statistical analysis provide a reminder that those “unsophisticated in statistics”
should proceed with caution. Moreover, there is an uncanny coincidence
between the Court’s common law, policy-laden analysis, and the heavyhanded direction its constitutional excessiveness decisions had been taking.
There are inevitable tensions between the Court’s constitutional due
process jurisprudence and its policy analysis of punitive damages as a common law remedy. Future punitive damages issues loom large. How far will
the Court go in terms of policing unpredictable civil awards? Will the Court
countenance certification of a mandatory punitive damages class under Rule
23(b)(1)(B)? And, finally, how far will the Court press its federalization of
the punitive damages remedy, especially if states step forward as antagonistic players?
Exxon Shipping encapsulates the previous two decades’ developments
in punitive damages jurisprudence. What is even more remarkable is that
the decision may also contain the seeds of the salient issues in punitive
damages for the next two decades.

